THE LEGALITY OF UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

•  AU -  African Union 
• ECOWAS -  Economic Community of West African States 
• EU - European Union 
• GDP - Gross Domestic Product 
• ICJ - International Court of Justice 
• IMF -  International Monetary Fund 
• JCPOA- Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
• UES - Unilateral Economic Sanctions 
• UN - United Nations 
• UN Charter - Charter of the United Nations 
• UNSC - United Nations Security Council 
• WTO - World Trade Organization

TABLE OF CONTENT

1. Introduction  

 2.0 The Doctrine of UES  in International Law and Governing Frameworks

 2.1 Prominent Examples of Unilateral Economic Sanctions in International Law 

 3.0 Beyond the Sanctions:Exploring the Implications and the Road Ahead 

 4.0 The Concluding Paragraph 

 5.0 Bibliography

 

THE LEGALITY OF UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

1.0 INTRODUCTION

“When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.” This  is the foundational principle of Goodhart’s Law, a philosophy which weighs the product of a goal through the scale of its essence. Simply put, it becomes the outcome when single-minded obsession is placed on achieving a specific target, often losing sight of the true purpose behind it, like students studying only to pass an exam instead of actually learning the subject or a parent disciplining their ward to inflict pain rather than as a tool for behavioral correction.

International Law, a body of rules established by custom or treaty and recognized by nations as binding in their relations with one another, has always been considered a toothless bulldog because although it possesses moral authority and global reach, it often lacks the power of enforcement which is the teeth that makes law effective. A growing but still minority of states initiate not just unilateral economic sanctions, but unilateral sanctions collectively to either advance their foreign policy objectives, assert geopolitical influence, or compel behavioral change in target states outside the framework of multilateral approval from global institutions like the UN, WTO, EU, ECOWAS or AU.

This is often done to bypass institutional stalemates, such as vetoes within the UNSC, or to respond swiftly to perceived violations of international norms, ranging from human rights abuses to threats against global peace and security. Reflecting Goodhart’s Law, the objective of this essay is to scrutinize the legitimacy or legality of UES in International Law, its governing frameworks and butterfly effect.

Keywords: International Law, Unilateral Economic Sanctions, Legality.

2.0 The Doctrine of UES  in International Law and Governing Frameworks 

Sanctions have always been a means to command order or deter certain outcomes, but it doesn't eliminate the probability of its existence. It is not enough that sanctions can be exercised at liberty, its unregulated application may result in dictatorship or anarchy. This is where International Law comes in alongside a pivotal question to the essence of this essay:

What are Unilateral Economic Sanctions?

Unilateral Economic Sanctions may be defined as sanctions imposed on a country by one or more countries without the permission of the Security Council mainly for retaliation, revenge or revision in policies inconsistent with the interests of the sanctioning country/countries. They may take various forms, such as trade embargoes, asset freezes, travel bans, suspension of financial aid, restrictions on banking transactions, export and import prohibitions, or withdrawal of investment and economic cooperation agreements. The theoretical justifications for UES  can be classified into four schools of thought: Realism, Liberalism, Legal Positivism, and Constructivism. The first argues on protection of national interests, power politics; the second builds on defense of human rights when the UN fails; the third highlights Sovereign right under domestic law; and the fourth opines it as a means of signaling disapproval and shaping norms. 

Amidst these theories cunningly crafted lies the voice of law and reason. The general rule in regards to unilateral economic sanctions is they are not backed by international law, in other words their exercise has been majorly argued to be unlawful except in specific circumstances. The UN Charter, Article 2(4) prohibits the use of economic or political coercion to influence the internal or external affairs of another sovereign state. This international legislation makes most unilateral intimidating sanctions prima facie unlawful. Articles 39-41 of the same legislation grants the UNSC the exclusive power to impose coercive economic measures to maintain international peace. In the case of Alleged Violations of th 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Iran alleged that the United States’ re-imposition of sanctions following its withdrawal from the JCPOA breached the 1955 Treaty of Amity by impairing Iranian–U.S. economic relations and consular rights. The ICJ rejected the U.S. preliminary objections and declared it had jurisdiction. This case highlights the fact that unilateral sanctions may be subject to international judicial scrutiny even in the absence of UN authorization. 

Furthermore, The International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility (2001, Articles 49–54) provide that “a state may adopt countermeasures, including temporary economic restrictions only:

In response to an internationally wrongful act committed by another state; If the measures are proportionate, reversible, and intended to induce compliance, not to punish.”

2.1 Prominent Examples of Unilateral Economic Sanctions in International Law 

The hypothesis of UES is not a mere theory without practical illustrations. There have been cases where powerful states resort to UES often to bully politically inferior states into succumbing to their demands. Where this fails, the result is an escalation in global crisis, war, and a potential fall in the GDP of the affected country. A few classical examples are:

• Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Iran v United States) : Iran brought the case to ICJ on 16 July 2018, alleging that the U.S.’ re-imposition of sanctions violated the 1955 Treaty of Amity. The ICJ found it had jurisdiction in a preliminary objections judgment of 3 February 2021.
• Unilateral U.S. sanctions on Venezuela: The U.S. imposed broad economic restrictions on Venezuela’s oil industry, finance sector and state-owned enterprises (e.g., Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA)). A research report suggests these sanctions cost Venezuela over US$38 billion in lost revenue.
• Unilateral U.S. sanctions on Cuba (including via the Helms–Burton Act): The U.S. embargo on Cuba and extraterritorial legislation such as Helms-Burton have been widely cited as unilateral measures challenged on sovereignty and extraterritoriality grounds. 
• Unilateral U.S. sanctions on Iran (e.g., freezing Iranian government assets via Executive Order 12170): On 14 November 1979, the U.S. froze Iranian government assets under Executive Order 12170, illustrating use of unilateral measures targeting another sovereign state’s assets.

These examples and the measured impacts do little justice to the actual effects UES had not just on the affected countries but its citizens as well which leaves am underlying question: “What is the way forward?" 

3.0 BEYOND THE SANCTIONS: EXPLORING THE IMPLICATIONS AND THE ROAD AHEAD

The butterfly effect of UES streamlines far beyond mere policies, their implications riddles stagnation across economies, societies, and legal orders. Target states often face major economic contractions, soaring inflation, disrupted trade and investment flows, and weakened public services, all of which can undermine human rights and development. Meanwhile, sanctioning states and global institutions face a road ahead that demands clearer legal frameworks, deeper multilateral engagement, and safeguards against unintended humanitarian harm. To that end, international organizations such as the IMF should contribute by monitoring the economic impact of sanctions, advising on recovery and reform for affected states, and ensuring that the humanitarian consequences are mitigated, thereby helping transform sanctions from blunt tools into responsible instruments of international law by ensuring transparency, proportionality, accountability and adherence to sovereign equality. The UN and similar international organizations need more than just laws without implementation bodies or means. It should be their first call of duty to protect the sovereignty of member states and the lives and welfare of its citizens.

4.0 CONCLUSION 

This inquiry is concluded upon the bedrock of Campbell’s Law often considered a twin to Goodhart’s Law which propounds that “The more a quantitative social indicator is used for decision-making, the more it becomes subject to corruption pressures and the more it distorts the social processes it is intended to monitor.” Unilateral Economic Sanctions though generally unlawful may be applied in a few exceptional circumstances under a temporary basis. 

However, if the quantitative social indicator (UES) becomes the primary response to perceived threats against the sovereignty of a state then there is high probability it will become an instrument of oppression and corruption. With the proposed reforms adapted accordingly, the status of International Law as a toothless bulldog may be salvaged and the unregulated use of UES will be curbed. 

5.0 Bibliography 

Books

• Campbell DT and Russo MJ, Social Measurement (Sage Publications 2001)
• Wellink AHE, Goodhart’s Law in Government Finances? Reprint no 452 (De Nederlandsche Bank 1996)

Articles

• Gordon J, ‘A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The Ethics of Economic Sanctions’ (1999) 13(1) Ethics & International Affairs 123
• Nourani SAS, ‘An Analysis of Unilateral Economic Sanctions in International Law: A Case Study of the United States’ (2022) Islamic Studies Journal https://doi.org/10.22034/isj.2022.292725.1525

International Instruments and Official Documents

• Charter of the United Nations (signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI
• Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (adopted 2001, ILC) arts 49–54

Cases

• Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 3 February 2021) [2021] ICJ Rep 9

Legislation and Executive Orders

• United States, Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (Helms–Burton Act), Pub L No 104-114, 110 Stat 785 (1996)
• United States, Executive Order 12170 (14 November 1979) “Blocking Iranian Government Property” 44 Fed Reg 65729 (1979)

Web Sources

• United States, ‘US Sanctions on Venezuela Cause US$232 billion in Losses Since 2015’ (Tasnim News Agency, 22 April 2023)